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外文翻譯-小額信貸-其他專業.doc

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外文翻譯-小額信貸-其他專業.doc

2010屆畢業生畢業論文 外 文 翻 譯 姓 名 院(系) 專業班級 學 號 指導老師 成 績 小額信貸是否幫助窮人 孟加拉國旗艦計劃所帶來的新證據 摘要小額信貸運動使金融中介機構得到了創新,同樣使貧困家庭減少了貸款的成本和風險。孟加拉國鄉村銀行的小額信貸機制已經在全世界得到推廣。雖然小額貸款機制的目的是為客戶帶來社會和經濟效益, 但是通過其獲得一定量的利益的嘗試已經開始實施了。本文借鑒一個新調查來研究小額信貸是是否真正的幫助窮人,該調查覆蓋面近1800個家庭,其中部分家庭獲得了孟加拉鄉村銀行的貸款,而另一部分則沒有參與到小額貸款運動中。有資格獲得貸款的家庭,他們的消費水平低于平均消費水平,這種家庭中,絕大部分的孩子不可能上得起學,男子也往往會有更多的工作壓力,而女子沒有工作。更明顯的,相對于對照組,符合貸款資格的家庭在消費上的變化很小以及可以常年提供勞動力的特點。最重要的潛在影響不是貧窮本身,而是因而最重要是減少相關的家庭漏洞。似乎導致消費平滑主要原因是收入平滑,而不是借款和貸款。 評論家有大量的關于低收入國家的其他方案的研究經驗。雖然通常人們都是使用固定效力評估來控制與安置方案有關的不易觀察的變量,但是使用固定效力評估會加劇偏見的影響,就如同本方案在較大的社區里特定人群的方案。 關鍵詞小額信貸,項目評估,鄉村銀行,孟加拉 1. 介紹 小額信貸在很多人的腦海里是用來減少貧困。前提是操作簡單。小額信貸提供小額貸款,以促進小規模的創業活動,而不是向貧困家庭提供救濟。這種信貸除非放債人收取非常高的利率往往收費高達每月10,否則不會發生。放債運作缺乏競爭,因為潛在的進入者很快發現,借款人通常不能提供任何形式的抵押品,這就使貸款存在高成本和該風險。拉希德和湯森,1993。 然而,體制創新下的小額信貸運動似乎大大降低了風險和提供金融服務和為貧困家庭提供服務的費用。創新包括借款合同、給予獎勵、配出不良信用風險和連帶借款人的活動,要求每周或每半周還款Morduch,1997。2005年該運動已經在世界銀行,聯合國領導人,以及其他已加入的國際組織的推動下成為聯系100萬家庭的全球性的運動小額信貸首腦會議,1997。該運動在美國還得到相當多的支持包括錢第一夫人希拉里克林頓,現在該方案在美國有300個經營點經濟學家,1997。紐約時報1997還發表慶祝這個“繼續的反貧窮方案的革命” 文章呼吁支持。 但是,小額貸款到底給貧困家庭帶來了怎樣的巨大的影響 雖然小額貸款確實做到了減少貧困,但只有極少數研究使用相當大的樣本和適當的治療/控制框架來研究這個問題。本研究調查了1800戶家庭在19911992年間的孟加拉國格拉名銀行的小額信貸項目,孟加拉國農村發展委員會BRAC,和孟加拉國農村發展委員會BRDB,本案例還包括了一組沒有任何小額貸款項目服務地區的家庭。這里考慮的這三個貸款方案在孟加拉國一共超過了400萬貧困客戶,它們的作用是非常廣泛的。格拉米銀行的國際小額信貸旗艦運動,其模式已經被四大洲所復制,包括在美國的阿肯色州和內城芝加哥都取得明顯成就。 從其帶來的影響我們可以簡單得出小額信貸所帶來的成就。例如,如果享受鄉村銀行服務的家庭按照從小額信貸項目貸款的總數來安排,則前四分之一的家庭享有人均消費相較于在底層四分之一的家庭要高出十五個百分點。另外, 62的從鄉村銀行貸款的家庭的男孩可以上學,而34的上學的男孩的家庭沒有貸款。而女孩的比例分別是55對40。 然而, 這些簡單的比較,大部分是由于選擇偏差造成的。一旦,對照組坐出了適當的比較,不管是受教育的男孩還是受教育的女孩,有權使用小額貸款項目的家庭并沒有明顯提高人均消費水平。總之,人均消費水平低于對照組。這一結論是驚人的,關于小額貸款的反對聲音也頻繁的在國際響起。 然而,有權獲得項目資助確實使常年勞動力變得多元化。相應的,該方法也降低常年各種各樣的消費,所以,盡管該項目并沒有提高平均消費水平,但他可以通過穩定收入的方法使這些家庭穩定消費水平。至于在其弱點上的影響,結果突出了小額貸款的優勢,這些優勢很少被關于小額信貸的文獻所關注(除皮特及科韓德科,1998b)。該項目得到了一億美金的援助,由此,我們也可以看到它的優勢。 這一結果同樣證明,評估者很容易誤導項目的成就,而且,他們擁有許多相似評估經驗,這些經驗包括公眾醫療及其他低收入國家的社會項目。同這里一樣,這些項目經常被限制在特殊的區域和特殊的目標人群,尤其是貧困家庭。不同于那些富有國家,收入為基礎意味著測試似乎從未進行過。反而,例如,孟加拉國鄉村小額貸款項目致力于“無地機能”,這條規定要求貸款的家庭必須有超過半英畝的可耕種土地。 如果這條合理要求被強制實施,并且是建立在家庭外因的特殊之上,這條項目規定將是合理統計的基礎。然后,我們就能從參與該項目的家庭組及未參與該項目的家庭組的比較中得到非常明朗的效果。這一方法是回歸間斷設計的一個形式(坎貝爾,1969年),其見解提供了皮特和科韓德科工作(1998a和1998 b;在這里,他們用了相同的數據)的基礎。 但是我們不能從這個例子里推出任何有效結論,這個數據說明人們經常違反規則。例如,30的鄉村貸款人擁有遠遠多于半英畝的土地,他們擁有土地所有權的面的有14英畝之大。那些記錄在案有權借款的家庭或有權參與項目的家庭,其中一部分所擁有的土地大概是2英畝,相對的其他那部分要少一點。 下面的方法反而通過在鄉村的比較,運用了測試組及對照組的數據。鄉村中沒有參與項目的組中,其采樣嚴格遵循半英畝規定。然而,參與項目的村里,同組的不對稱性在這里同樣出現了問題。采樣戰略在一開始就是一個解決辦法。采樣是設計好的,這樣,對照組才可以同測試組作比較。強制要求測試組需要同對照組一樣嚴格按照規定強制執行要求。 另外需要關注非隨機安置方案的是,當考慮到地區固定影響水平或者他們的對等性時(例如皮特和科韓德科,1998a)。當方案選擇已經完成的好的地區的時候,出現向上偏差;當項目傾向于不發達地區時,則出現向下偏差。 然后,柜員頻繁聲明這并不是解決非隨機安置方案的萬靈藥。實際上,當項目安置被預測到針對目標人群沒有觀察到影響時,包括地區固定影響水平能使偏差增大。這個數據暗示,這是經常出現的狀況。但是,帶著減少變化和勞動力供應的期待,主要的定性結果對測試組及對照組的不易觀察的鄉村水平是健全的。 小額信貸在新興優勢突出的成果使得其很少考慮其脆弱性,這些好處應當判斷有數百萬美元支持這些方案。研究結果還表明如何判別簡單的誤導性的指標,他們持有類似的在低收入國家其他社會項目評估如公共健康和低收入的經驗教訓。由于,這些計劃往往局限于特定地區和特定目標群體即典型的貧困家庭,所以,以收入為基礎的測試方法幾乎在較富裕的國家從來沒有使用過。 Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh Abstract The microfinance movement has built on innovations in financial intermediation that reduce the costs and risks of lending to poor households. Replications of the movement’s flagship, the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, have now spread around the world. While programs aim to bring social and economic benefits to clients, few attempts have been made to quantify benefits rigorously. This paper draws on a new cross-sectional survey of nearly 1800 households, some of which are served by the Grameen Bank and two similar programs, and some of which have no access to programs. Households that are eligible to borrow and have access to the programs do not have notably higher consumption levels than control households, and, for the most part, their children are no more likely to be in school. Men also tend to work harder, and women less. More favorably, relative to controls, households eligible for programs have substantially and significantly lower variation in consumption and labor supply across seasons. The most important potential impacts are thus associated with the reduction of vulnerability, not of poverty per se. The consumption-smoothing appears to be driven largely by income-smoothing, not by borrowing and lending. The evaluation holds lessons for studies of other programs in low-income countries. While it is common to use fixed effects estimators to control for unobservable variables correlated with the placement of programs, using fixed effects estimators can exacerbate biases when, as here, programs target their programs to specific populations within larger communities. Key words microfinance, project evaluation, Grameen Bank, Bangladesh 1. Introduction Microfinance has captured the imaginations of many people working to reduce poverty. The premise is simple. Rather than giving handouts to poor households, microfinance programs offer small loans to foster small-scale entrepreneurial activities. Such credit would otherwise not be available -- or would be only available at the very high interest rates charged by moneylenders who often charge as much as 10 per month. Moneylenders operate with little competition since potential entrants quickly find that costs and risks are high -- and borrowers are usually unable to offer standard forms of collateral, if any at all Rashid and Townsend, 1993. However, the emerging microfinance movement demonstrates institutional innovations that appear to greatly reduce the risk and cost of providing financial services to poor households. Innovations include contracts that give borrowers incentives to exclude bad credit risks and monitor other borrowers’ activities, schedules of loans that increase over time conditional on successful performance, and weekly or semi-weekly loan repayment requirements Morduch, 1997. The movement is now global, and leaders at the World Bank, United Nations, and other international organizations have joined in pushing to reach 100 million households around the world by the year 2005 Microfinance Summit, 1997. The movement has also generated considerable support in the U.S. including the high-profile support of Hillary Rodham Clinton; Buntin, 1997, and small-scale programs now operate in 300 U.S. sites Economist, 1997. The New York Times 1997 has celebrated this “much-needed revolution in anti-poverty programs” and called for enhanced support. But how great is the ultimate impact on poor households While strong claims are made for the ability of microfinance to reduce poverty, only a handful of studies use sizeable samples and appropriate treatment/control frameworks to answer the question. The present study investigates a 1991-92 cross-sectional survey of nearly 1800 households in Bangladesh served by microfinance programs of the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee BRAC, and the Bangladesh Rural Development Board BRDB. The sample also includes a control group of households in areas not served by any microfinance programs. The three lending programs considered here together serve over four million poor clients in Bangladesh, but their role is much broader. The Grameen Bank is the flagship of the international microfinance movement, and its model has now been replicated on four continents, including sites in the United States as varied as rural Arkansas and inner-city Chicago. Simple estimates of impacts show clear achievements. For example, if households served by the Grameen Bank are ordered by the amounts they have borrowed from the program, the top quarter enjoys 15 higher consumption per capita than households in the bottom quarter. In addition, 62 of the school-age sons of Grameen Bank borrowers are enrolled in school versus 34 of the sons of eligible households that do not borrow. For daughters, the Grameen advantage is 55 versus 40. These simple comparisons appear to be driven entirely by selection biases, however. Once appropriate comparisons with control groups are made, access to the three microfinance programs does not yield meaningful increases in per capita consumption, the education of sons, nor the education of daughters. If anything, the levels are slightly lower than for control groups. The results are surprising and contradict frequent claims made about the programs in international discussions of microfinance. Access to the programs does, however, appear to aid the diversification of labor supply across seasons. In turn, access is associated with a reduction in the variability of consumption across seasons. Thus, while the programs may not increase consumption on average, they may offer households ways to smooth consumption through smoothing income. In pointing to impacts on vulnerability, the results highlight an advantage that is seldom considered in the emerging microfinance literature an exception is Pitt and Khandker, 1998a. These benefits should be judged against the tens of millions of dollars that have supported the programs. The results also demonstrate how misleading simple performance indicators can be, and they hold lessons for evaluations of similar public health and other social programs in low-income countries.1 As here, such programs are often limited to particular regions and particular target groups, typically poor households. Unlike in wealthier countries, income-based means tests are almost never used. Instead, for example, the microfinance programs in rural Bangladesh focus on the “functionally landless” -- implemented as a rule barring lending to households owning over a half acre of cultivable land. The program rule can be the basis of a plausible econometric strategy if the eligibility requirement is strictly enforced and built around a feature that is exogenous to the household.Then, clean impacts can be gauged by comparing the status of households clustered just below the arbitrary dividing line to households clustered just above. This approach is a form of regression discontinuity design Campbell, 1969, and the insights provide the basis of Pitt and Khandker’s.1Simple evaluations are subject to multiple selection biases self-selection into the programs by the most able, non-random program placement, and endogenous determination of the intensity of participation e.g., the size of loans in microfinance. The typical problem stems from the near impossibility of finding good instrumental variables work 1998a and 1998b; they use the same data as used here. But the idea can not be implemented reliably in this sample. The data demonstrate frequent violations of the rules. For example, 30 of Grameen borrowers own more land than the half-acre cut-off, with landholdings as large as fourteen acres. Among households labeled in the survey as “eligible” to borrow and with access to programs, the fraction of borrowers is nearly twice as high for those holding over half an acre versus those below 63 versus 34 for the three programs combined; The first two rows of Table 1 give figures disaggregated by program. Counter to historical observations suggesting an absence of land markets in South Asia, there is also substantial evidence of land sales. The data show that nearly one eighth of borrowers purchased substantial amounts of land in the six years prior to the survey. The approach below instead exploits the treatment/control aspect of the data through comparisons across villages. The groups in villages not served by programs were sampled with strict adherence to the half acre rule, however, and the asymmetry with groups in program villages creates problems here as well. A solution is to turn the sampling strategy on its head. While the sample was designed so that the control groups are comparable to the “treated” groups, the rule violations require that the treatment groups be redefined in order to bring them into conformity with the controls. An additional concern is given by non-random program placement. Upward biases arise when programs choose regions that are already doing well, and downward biases arise when programs favor disadvantaged areas. The typical response to the problem is to estimate impacts .

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